Media Actors at the Dividing Lines of Information Society: Civil Society Media at the World Summit on the Information Society

Arne Hintz
arine.hintz@web.de
Research Centre Media & Politics
Department of Social Sciences
University of Hamburg
1. Introduction

Control over and access to symbols, norms and interpretations of current events play a vital role in the societies of the 21st century. Actors who produce and distribute information on important social, political and economic developments – such as the mass media and the news agencies – hold an increasingly important position in contemporary social orders. The type of information they send out, however, is heavily influenced by the structural framework of the production and distribution of information. We are witnessing a rapid concentration of established media power in the hands of large transnational media corporations, on the one hand, and an increasing number of local and alternative media projects as well as growing pressure by campaigns promoting democratisation of and public access to media, on the other hand.

Academic Research in the Political Economy of Communication, International Political Economy, and International Relations has examined the structural forces of production and distribution of information, and has highlighted issues around the globalisation of media, the power of knowledge, ideas and ideologies, the concepts of ‘soft power’ and ‘symbolic power’. It has shown a strong interest in the role of communication actors, the interests which influence their behaviour, and the impact these actors can have on governance frameworks. The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), whose first part has taken place in Geneva in December 2003, has represented a major platform for struggles on the future of the global communication system, and for media actors to influence communication governance. Within a long series of recent United Nations summits on issues such as environment, development and food security, the WSIS has been the first to focus on information and communication.

This paper will illustrate the preliminary results of a research project on the WSIS, for which I have followed the activities of media actors at and around the summit. It focuses on alternative and community media which I integrate under the term Civil Society Media. Mapping the terrain of divergent media structures, I will first develop a model which presents Civil Society Media as a counter-model to commercial, concentrated mass media, and which opens a multiform field of tension between both media types. Based on this framework I will illustrate the structures of participation by Civil Society Media actors in the WSIS process, examine their aims and strategies, and evaluate the effects of the summit for the media sector. Dividing lines between the objectives of different types of media actors will be of particular interest.

The example of media actors at the WSIS can clarify some of the more general lines of conflict within the developing information society. It will illustrate diverging and opposing interpretations of information society, analyse the patterns of interest on which they are based, and integrate them in transnational political-economic frameworks. This paper presents media not as neutral observers but as protagonists at an international summit and therefore in the international political realm. It seeks to contribute to an emerging research agenda of Political Economy of Communication by advancing knowledge about the role of Civil Society Media in the international political-economic arena.

---

2. Media in a global context

2.1 Commercial media and Public Service

Traditionally there are two types of media which have determined the shape of the worldwide media sector for much of recent history – the commercial and the public service media models. While the former has developed most strongly in the US, which is still home to some of the largest media companies, the latter is mainly associated with European media history and a specific European approach to the cultural, political and economic sphere. The two models were also exported around the globe to the various areas of influence of both regions.

During the past two to three decades a coexistence of both media types has been established particularly in the European countries. The worldwide ideological paradigm shift leading to the liberalisation of media markets and neoliberal restructuring of national economies, pressure by the growing media corporations, and technological advances, such as the introduction of cable and satellite delivery, has led to the emergence of private media providers alongside public service media. At the same time, public service providers have felt the pressures of commercialisation and have been forced to adapt to the methods of generating revenue as well as to the organisational structures of their commercial competitors. While there continue to be many distinct characteristics of commercial and public service media, respectively, there are also important similarities in terms of organisation, content sources, relationships with specific social groups, journalistic values and routines, amongst many others. Both models are subject to similar sets of constraints and are exposed to similar challenges. Therefore, in this paper, I will focus on the commonalities of both models, which will serve as distinct contrasts to the characteristics of the Civil Society Media model which I will introduce hereafter. The following sections will introduce some of the major pressures and contraints which these media have been facing.

2.2 Global media concentration

One of the most dynamic features of the contemporary world economy, the media industry is growing at a staggering rate. The restructuring of media companies has been particularly intense in the past years, as the sector has been subject to accelerating concentration. Newspapers, TV stations, movie producers, book publishers, record companies and other related businesses have merged, have acquired other companies and have increasingly been concentrated around a small number of global conglomerates. The large numbers of new media companies created during waves of liberalisation were just as quickly integrated into existing companies or served as the basis for new corporate empires, with the Italian Fininvest as the prime example. In the US, the company Clearchannel currently controls more than 1200 radio stations.

In addition to horizontal concentration within a particular media sector, media corporations have expanded vertically into different levels of the industry, in order to control both the production and distribution of media software. The Disney take-over of the US network ABC in 1995, and the merger of America Online (AOL) and Time Warner in 2001 both combined some of the world’s biggest content creators and distribution channels. At present, six such

---

2 Petley/Romano 1993
3 http://www.takebackthemedia.com/radiogaga.html
4 see Wasco 1997
Vertically integrated conglomerates represent the core of the world-wide media market: AOL Time Warner, Viacom, Disney, News Corporation, Vivendi-Universal, and Bertelsmann, with other major corporations such as Sony, NBC/General Electric, Comcast ATT, TCI/Liberty and Cox Enterprises following closely. Small media firms, such as film studios or national newspapers, are located in networks around the core companies, with which they often enter strategic alliances or joint ventures, tying them to the needs and strategies of the big corporations. Ex-CEO of TCI and ‘media mogul’ John Malone, has been quoted with the statement, that only two or three companies may eventually dominate the media and telecommunications services.6

Concentration is even more advanced in the news sector. The vast majority of news from other parts of the world is provided by three global agencies: Reuters, Associated Press (AP) and Agence France-Presse (AFP). In contrast to the developments in the rest of the media industry, news distribution has occurred in centralised structures ever since the British Reuters, the French Havas, and the German Wolff formed a global news cartel in 1859 and carved up the world into exclusive territories of influence.7

With AP running APTN and Reuters operating Reuters Television, audiovisual news distribution is effectively controlled by only two companies. Some television news services, such as CNN and BBC World Service, are producing their own material but also subscribe to the agencies. Murdoch’s Sky and Fox news networks depend strongly on Reuters for international coverage.8 National news channels are developing rapidly, but are just as quickly integrated in the existing networks – the German N-TV, for example, has become the official German outlet of CNN. The new middle eastern news channels Al-Jazeera and Al-Aribiya have added a new element as they are based in a different cultural background and therefore offer an alternative to the Anglo-Saxon domain of television news. At the same time, however, they also draw from Western news values and don’t fundamentally refute the structure of news reporting set out by the traditional networks.

2.3. Content: structural biases in the media

As the example of audiovisual news agencies illustrates, the cultural background of media producers can have a strong influence on media content and can lead to one of the inherent biases in the media. Both principal agencies have an Anglo-American background and are based in London. Most foreign news must pass through this bottleneck before being sent to the rest of the world. A small number of culturally homogenous news workers in a few very similar organisations can therefore, consciously or unconsciously, shape the perceptions people have of large parts of the world.

News agencies are closely linked to the interests of financial markets. Their growth in recent decades has been largely through financial and economic news services. By 1997 Reuters’ income from these services represented 95% of revenues, with general news earning a tiny 5%.9 Accurate, reliable and fast information on the latest developments in the financial markets is the basis on which these markets work. Agencies involved in financial news

6 Dawson/Foster 1998
7 Rantanen 1998
9 Boyd-Barrett 1998, Palmer/Boyd-Barrett/Rantanen 1998. Again, this interest in business affairs is not new, as the news cartel of 1859 was in fact preceded by an agreement among the three big agencies concerning the exchange of stockmarket prices in 1856.
services, thus, operate at the heart of modern international capitalism. Reporting on critical voices concerning neoliberal globalisation, or putting too much emphasis on the negative impacts of financial markets and corporate activity may not in the interest of Reuters et al.

Demand for financial news has also contributed to the shaping of Western news ideology as ‘impartial’ and ‘objective’, and to the commodification of news. The supposedly factual and objective character of ‘spot-news’ implicitly assumes the social and political order as fixed and neglect how this order came into being. They render invisible structures and relations of power and thus legitimise prevailing power structures.10 Necessary preconditions of this ‘journalism of information’ are both the impartiality of the journalist, and the state of news agencies as autonomous and independent organisations. The notion of autonomy within Western news values, however, privileges concerns about formal political processes over concerns about economic and financial dependencies.

Such dependencies can be based directly on media ownership, as has been highlighted in Herman/Chomsky’s model of filters, which outlines the gates a news item has to pass before being distributed to the viewer or reader.11 Many media outlets are linked directly or indirectly to the big conglomerates, all of which are transnational corporations, sharing the distinct interests of this sector. Some are linked to non-media companies such as General Electric, which is involved in arms manufacturing. Critical coverage by media of their owners and related activities is rather unlikely, if not impossible.12

As commercial mass media rely on advertising as their basic financial resource, advertisers’ choices concerning appropriate media for their messages influence the prosperity and survival of newspapers and TV channels. In this sense, they can act as “de facto licensing authority”. Alternative frameworks of analysis can be boycotted by advertisers, if they do not appreciate the contents and the environment of the particular paper or channel.13 Even news programmes are affected, with the press and the broadcast media increasingly conducting surveys to locate the news that would be enjoyed by the affluent market desired by advertisers. News Corporation’s Fox News Channel, according to their chairman, “is directed at the needs of advertisers”.14

News sources are probably the most fundamental filter. Media usually rely on the sources they can easily access, as well as on sources that are seen as ‘competent’ and ‘authorised’, such as government officials or the police. News from these sources is often accepted as factual information by viewers and readers, eliminating the time-consuming search for alternative voices. The distinct interests and objectives of the ‘factual’ sources, however, are rarely questioned.15

---

10 Golding 1997; Cox 1981
11 Herman/Chomsky 1988
12 For example, according to the alternative news provider Undercurrents, Times newspaper columnist Doug Gray resigned in 1998 following the paper’s pulling of his critical column about digital television, in which he stated that it is necessary to “oppose the monopolistic workings of media moguls”, criticising in particular Times owner Rupert Murdoch (http://www.Undercurrents.org, 1999).
13 The US public-television station WNET lost funding of several programmes from a company in 1985 after having broadcast a critical documentary of multinational corporate activity. It was told that this was not an appropriate behaviour “of a friend” of the corporation, and it probably has not done the same ‘mistake’ again (Herman/Chomsky 1988).
14 McChesney 1998, Herman/McChesney 1997
15 Robinson 1995
Finally, the role of the journalists themselves is a major factor in determining the angle of reports. Both their social position and the constraints of the profession are important in this respect. With regards to the former, journalism often brings about close ties with society’s dominant elites, and professional relationships and daily face-to-face communication often lead to social loyalties. Far from being ‘impartial observers of power’, top political journalists often share similar lifestyles – and similar opinions – with the government officials and business leaders they ‘observe’. In addition, journalists have to treat government officials, societal leaders, and the institutions they represent with cautious deference if they want to continue to have access to the latest news, be the recipients of a news ‘leak’, be given regular briefings, or even accompany the troops as an ‘embedded’ reporter in the next war.

A combination of these factors can lead to a bias in reporting in favour of the interests and opinions of political and economic elites. Some of the most widespread examples of this bias include a media focus on atrocities by what their own government would regard as enemy states, while failing to report on atrocities by ‘allies’, a media blackout on their own government’s true intentions for war, and a failure to expose the social effects of international business agreements which the media benefit from. Extensive documentation on such cases has been gathered by communication scholars and by organisations such as FAIR.

As an ever greater number of media is being controlled by an ever smaller number of media enterprises, and as the latter are exposed to similar sets of constraints which favour certain types of content over others, the production of media information is structured in a way that does not foster diversity of content. In a Habermasian sense, the result may lead to an increasing enclosure of the public information sphere. Ironically, the same actors which have, according to Habermas, originally been crucial forces in opening up a public sphere – the mass media – are now helping to reduce it. Despite the substantial shortcomings of Habermas’ notion of the public sphere, the general concept of a contrast between a constrained distribution of information, led by hegemonic powers, and an interactive, less constrained communication sphere with zones of critical debate, is a useful framework for looking at the media sector. While independence of state control continues to be an important aspect of an open information sphere, influences due to economic pressures have increased dramatically. The interests of nation-states may not determine media content anymore, but there are other sets of interests which have a strong impact on the work of media organisations. Some of those will be pointed out in the final section of this chapter.

2.4. Transnational social structures

From a North-South perspective, a largely one-way stream of information continues to flow from the industrialised countries to the rest of the world, while most news from the South has to pass the bottle-neck of the Anglo-Saxon news agencies. Yet the state-centric approach of cultural imperialism, as was advocated in the 1970s particularly, seems hard to maintain in times of increasing trans-border economic activities. Neither the news agencies, nor the media-cultural industries retain exclusive ties with particular nation-states, which would make them part of deliberate state-led imperialist strategies. Rather than a clear-cut division between Northern and Southern states, we have been witnessing a transnationalisation of economic, political, and social structures. Concepts of core and periphery increasingly apply

16 Rodriguez 1995
17 http://www.fair.org
18 Webster 1995; Habermas 1990
19 see, for example, Thompson 1995
20 see Galtung 1971; Thompson 1995
within as well as across states. A new type of core comprises groups and alliances of transnational actors. The most visible of these are transnational corporations, business networks such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), political associations like the G8, and institutions such as the WTO. The actors who are either involved or sympathising with this transnational concentration of authority have been called “transnational managerial class” or “transnational capitalist class”.21 Their main objectives can be seen as organising the conditions under which the interests of global capital and the maintenance of a stable system can be furthered within the international, national and local context.

The global media, i.e. those that have links to or even represent the large media conglomerates, are an integral part of such transnational elite networks. As business operations with a global view, they strive for the expansion of global economic activity as well as enabling governance structures. However they also play a crucial supportive role by providing other transnational actors with the political and economic information needed, and by contributing to the production of values and attitudes favourable for their activities. An increasingly universal world economy requires both information about developments in various parts of the world, and a universal ideological and cultural environment, and this is where the media-cultural industries have a role to play. This transnational sphere is not formed by equal contribution by all who are party to it, but is structured according to particular perspectives and interests, specific cultural backgrounds, and related worldviews. It implicitly involves either the incorporation, the marginalisation, or the extinction of cultural practices that are not able or willing to adapt to ‘modern lifestyles’, industrialisation, urbanisation, as well as the governance aspects of increased implementation of transnational authority.22 While the large global media can be aligned closely to the interests leading to this development, many Civil Society Media perceive the latter as exactly the problem they oppose.

3. Civil Society Media

3.1. Civil Society – a definition

At the centre of this paper there are two terminological constructs which have been strongly disputed in recent academic discourses: information society and civil society. While the former will be linked closely to the understanding put forward by the summit documents, the latter represents the basis of my own definition of Civil Society Media and therefore requires a closer look. With no generally agreed definition of „civil society“, the term remains ambiguous and vague, while, on the other hand, enjoying attraction as a common platform for ideas, projects and policy proposals to be shared by a variety of actors.

Traditionally the term has often been used to highlight distinctions between „civil“ and „uncivil“ societies, in which „civil“ has usually described the democratic or republican „civilised“ West. Normative concepts related to this interpretation remain an important part of civil society research, for example the focus on minimizing violence in social relations, or on „civilised“ rational discourse.23 However my own definition is primarily structural. It is based on a growing common understanding of the concept during the second half of the 20th century. Civil society, according to this definition, represents the non-state and non-business

---

21 Gill 1991; Sklair 1995; Sklair 2001; Cox 1981
22 Gill 1995
23 see Kaldor 2003
realm. It entails forms of social interaction that are distinct from both the state and the market. This concept resembles the use of the term civil society within UN structures, although even there the understanding of „civil society“ varies. For example, the Cardoso commission for outlining relationships between the UN and civil society has adopted a „broad, inclusive definition of civil society“ which includes the private sector, while at the same time recognizing that including both business and the media is problematic and may cause objections. In many UN practices, however, including the WSIS processes, business is separated from civil society.

Civil society, understood as non-state non-business associations and initiatives may exert a counter-balance to the power of the state and of major institutions from both the political and the economic realm. Yet at the same time it may become a substitute for the state and the market and take over parts of their former functions. Both effects of non-state non-business civil society activity are possible, as different parts of civil society focus on different objectives and practices – change or stability, advocacy or service provision, struggle or consent generation. My interpretation of civil society thus has a strong base in what Mary Kaldor calls the „activist“ or „Post-Marxist“ version of civil society, which aims at a redistribution of power, a radicalisation of democracy, an extension of participation and autonomy, and which is based on active citizenship and social movements. Yet a second aspect of this model is what she calls the „neoliberal“ version of civil society – a non-profit voluntary „third sector“ which provides a substitute for many former state functions, for example in the field of welfare.

This „neoliberal“ aspect represents one of the most widespread points of criticism towards the concept of civil society. As „de facto instruments of extended states“ the professionalised and bureaucratised non-governmental organisations (NGOs), particularly, are a response to downsized governments, postfordist restructuring and outsourcing. Their dependence on corporate funding and on support from state agencies puts their „third sector“ position into question. Focusing on isolated „projects“, they decontextualize social struggles, and advocating individual rights and freedoms rather than collective welfare, they may advance public acceptance of the neoliberal global economic model. Sometimes different sections of civil society find themselves on different sides of „the fence“, like at the World Economic Forum in 2001, when several major NGOs such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International accepted an invitation to discuss with business and political leaders inside the forum, while social movement activists were protesting outside.

Often associated with rule-governed societies based on the consent of individuals, rather than coercion, civil society is an increasingly important force in the construction of systems of rules. It plays an equally important role in legitimizing these rules and in generating consent to political and economic orders – just as in Gramsci’s concept of domination and hegemony, which he said is based on consent by civil society. As we shall see when we look at the events around the WSIS, notions of consent and legitimacy have been central to civil society involvement in this summit.

Despite the often fundamental differences in approaches and objectives between different civil society actors, I would argue that there is also a set of normative aspects common to most actors embraced by this structural model of civil society. Many of these organisations,

---

25 Kaldor 2003
26 Zehle 2003
27 Zalik 2004
associations and movements have their roots in discontent with state paternalism and in an opposition to the overwhelming power (and power abuses) of large institutions. They therefore share a tendency towards autonomy, self-organisation, empowerment, emancipation, pluralism, voluntary association and horizontal networks – even if their structures may have developed in very different ways. Driven by a concern for civil and human rights and a „common good“, they put an emphasis on issues such as environmental degradation, human rights, civil justice, poverty eradication, racism and sexism. Despite their differences, they tend to share this common set of values.

3.2. A synthesis of Civil Society Media

The concept of Civil Society (CS) Media encompasses media organisations, groups, and projects, which fit into the basic non-state non-commercial model and which share the structural and thematic tendencies of civil society. Just like civil society, the boundaries of CS Media are not straightforward. The concept, as I use it, includes actors which some would not subsume under the same category, and it excludes others which some would see as integral parts of civil society. Generally it comprises all „third sector“ media and therefore excludes the two biggest sectors, namely commercial and public service media. While commercial media are core members of the business sector, the role of public service media is not so obvious. However I would argue that their organisational structures, their journalist principles, and particularly their fundamental links with the objectives of the nation state put them firmly outside the realm of CS Media.

CS Media have been described in different names and forms. Here I want to point to three of them:

Community Media is the most general concept within CS Media. It describes media based in and working for either local communities or communities of interest. These media focus on issues which are directly relevant to the specific community – news from the village, programmes in migrant or traditional languages, educational programmes, a focus on an issue area marginalised by the mainstream media. Community media may be a response to pressures of cultural homogenisation, deficiencies in the media system, political and social marginalisation, threats to traditional languages, or they may just show the ability of „non-professionals“ to organise media production themselves. Community media are often characterised by a high degree of openness and possibilities for participation.

Alternative Media is the other widespread term which explains important characteristics of CS Media. It is „alternative“ in a structural sense, focusing on collective production, economic independence and a non-hierarchical organisational model, but especially it is „alternative“ in terms of content. Counter-information is its main objective. It seeks to break hegemonic discourses, as transported through the mainstream media, uncovers and criticises power and domination, highlights social struggles and the activities of social movements, and has a strong base within those movements. It supports social change. Categories related to this concept are Critical Media28 and Radical Media29.

Tactical Media are leaving the bipolar world of counter-information behind and seek to break out of subcultural ghettoes. A „repertoire of dirty little practices“30, they encompass critical media actions, campaigns and interventions which are temporary, pragmatic and flexible.

---

28 iz3w 2004
29 Downing 2001
30 Lovink 2003; also see Garcia/Lovink 1999
These hybrid forms, often based on the innovative activities by smaller groups or individuals, rather than wider social movements, seek to obstruct and sabotage the forces of neoliberal capitalism from inside their own parameters.

These three categories highlight different aspects of CS Media. The borders between them are permeable. Many Critical Media serve a particular community of interest, while many Community Media transmit oppositional content. Tactical media may have appeared as a counter-model to Alternative Media, but they may as well be understood as a particular historic formation of CS Media, based in the context of the post-cold-war period and the ‘end of ideology’ – a defensive form of CS Media which has changed its tone back towards more straightforward alternative information with the revival of anti-capitalist discourses and the assertion that „another world is possible“ since the end of the millennium.

The concept of CS Media embraces a wide range of media actors, from small grassroots media projects to large media organisations. In a concept that broad, there can be vast differences between individual entities, but there is a distinct set of common features which offers a clear framework and unveils the aspects of difference to the media model described before. I will now give a few examples of CS Media to illustrate some of the characteristics of this model. By no means do these examples pretend to offer an overview over the richness of the CS Media sector.

### 3.2 CS Media – examples and practices

Many communities and dissident groups gather, share, and distribute information; amongst themselves but also to the wider public. Supported by the relatively cheap availability of media technologies, such as desktop publishing and video technology, they can „by-pass the mainstream media“ and provide information themselves. Printed and photocopied publications represent the most widespread way of grassroots information sharing – practically all oppositional activities, from the local environmental initiative to revolutionary movements, are accompanied by leaflets, flyers, brochures, or newsletters in order to raise awareness for specific concerns and to mobilise the public. A variety of regular publications range from open fora, made up entirely of readers’ contributions, such as the German *Interim*, to edited activist newsletters, such as the British *Schnews*, to professional magazines, such as the *Internationalist*.

Video activist groups like the German *AK Kraak* or the British *Undercurrents* produce regular alternative news videos showing „the news you don’t see on the news“, as well as documentaries on social justice resistance or on influential institutions. Public screenings of such films add an interactive element. For example, the Brazilian video groups *TV Viva* and *TV Maxambomba* screen their documentaries in public places and afterwards invite the audience to discuss the topics addressed in the videos instead of just consuming them.32

Elsewhere, video groups are experimenting with terrestrial TV distribution of video programmes. An example would be *Candida* from Rome and, generally, the Italian street TV experiences. In some countries, public access slots in public service TV programmes offer civil society groups the possibility to broadcast TV programmes to a mass audience. Groups like the New York TV collective *Paper Tiger* gather contributions of grassroots video producers from the area, compile them as a TV programme and screen them via public access

---

31 slogan by the Indymedia network
32 Mader 1993
slots, using satellite transmission for distribution. The shows have consistently been used to distribute information on marginalised issues and critical opinions.

While one of the general characteristics of such ‘activist’ media is to give voice to the marginalised, community radio remains a crucial technology by which the marginalised can create their own means to strengthen their voice. The production of radio programmes does not require vast technical or financial resources, and serves as an important channel for local content, created by local communities and relevant for local environments. In the very lively African community radio scene, such content often focuses on, for example, educational issues, health, desertification and hunger, and environmental issues.\(^{33}\) This specific combination of offering relevant local content and taking media production into one’s own hands is also the guiding principle of citizens’ radios and ‘open channels’ in the global North, as it is the background to many pirate radio stations in the world’s metropolitan centres.

The Internet has become a major platform for distributing alternative content. Organisations such as OneWorld, networks such as the Association for Progressive Communication (APC), and Webmagazines such as ZMag provide alternative accounts of global developments and offer a wealth of news and analysis which often matches the content quantity on mainstream news sites. Even more significantly, the Internet makes alternative real-time reporting possible, without having to rely on resource-consuming satellite broadcasting, and thus without requiring the financial and structural background of large media organisations. On June 18th 1999 („J18“) media activists used a combination of text-based and audiovisual media platforms and a variety of affordable media technology to provide „near-live“ web-based reporting of the anti-capitalist protests taking place around the globe on that day. A few months later, the first Indymedia website reported live from the anti-WTO protests in Seattle and successfully counter-acted corporate media misinformation about the event. Since then, more than a hundred Indymedia nodes have cropped up around the world. Recently web-based reporting has focused on web-TV streams, for example about the F15 anti-war protests, proving that a few committed people are able to provide high-quality TV coverage without the support and background of a media corporation. Most significantly, all these efforts have put the interactive character of the Internet to best use by empowering web-users to publish their own reports through open-publishing mechanisms.

On a much more institutionalised scale, alternative news agencies are distributing information on marginalised communities and neglected issues to the mainstream media. Regarding their organisational structure, they may operate very differently from activist networks such as Indymedia, but in terms of content and general objectives, there are important similarities. Such news agencies range from community-based operations, such as the Maori news organisation Mana Maori Ltd. in New Zealand\(^{34}\), to the worldwide network of the Inter Press Service (IPS). As the largest purveyor of information about the developing countries and a major news source for issues related to poverty, human rights, environmental degradation, amongst others, IPS is certainly one of the ‘big agencies’, and occasionally its content is used by mainstream media on the same level as that of Reuters et al.\(^{35}\) However, its emphasis on content that goes relatively uncovered in the media, its direct links to civil society actors, and its position as a non-profit, non-governmental organisation clearly identify it as an alternative provider.

\(^{33}\) UNESCO 1997

\(^{34}\) Fox 1993

\(^{35}\) Studies about the amount of reporting on the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in the print media in 1991 revealed that 13.2 % of news agency reports came from IPS, making it the third most often cited agency in this field, ahead of Reuters (Giffard 1998).
3.3 Characteristics of CS Media

A crucial feature of many of the CS Media I have just pointed to is their participatory character. Whereas traditional commercial and public service media are operating according to a one-way flow of information from sender to receiver, CS Media break the boundaries between active producers and passive consumers. Not all of them use a system as direct as Indymedia, allowing the public to determine the content in its entirety and reducing the role of the editors to one of moderators arranging the public’s reports. But most of them offer low-level access for media non-professionals to get involved in media production. The use of technology is emancipatory and interactive, and it values popular involvement higher than the passive absorption of professionalised products.

CS Media serve as the main access channels to news and other information for large parts of the world population – “access” understood as both the ability to receive information and to participate in its construction. This applies particularly to remote communities, but also to marginalised people and interests. Catering for tastes, interests, and orientations neglected in the mainstream media, and giving voice to groups, ideas, and cultures otherwise not heard, CS Media support the participation of marginalised communities in political, social and cultural processes.36 Experimenting with media technology develops capacities and empowers people. As the web TV experiments have shown, the public may actually find out that their capacities are far more developed than elite forces may want to make them believe.

Critique of mainstream media content, provision of alternative views, and expressing oppositional strands within popular cultures represent a general tendency in the content of CS Media. By addressing trends like poverty, inequality and environmental degradation, they confront people with the disruptions and cleavages in modern societies and motivate them to address such issues themselves. As the brief overview above has shown, many of those media explicitly bring forward subjective accounts of events and developments and thereby break with traditional journalistic values of impartial and objective reporting. As they regard the concept of objectivity as questionable, at least, their approach is to participate in social movements and to make this involvement explicit.

Opening spaces for participatory communication, CS Media react to the perceived enclosure of information and communication channels by commercial media. They create fractures in the domination of, and reclaim public space from, the enclosure by global organisations, in this case the global news agencies and media conglomerates. And in so doing, they become part of a wider struggle against a centralisation of authority and in favour of decentralised practices. The protagonists of this current struggle, often mis-named „anti-globalisation movement“, are mostly organised as grassroots groups, connected through global networks, such as People’s Global Action (PGA) or the Social Fora. Diversity, autonomy, decentralisation and horizontality as characteristics of both their organisational structures and their social objectives represent a clear counterpart to forces of centralisation and homogenisation inherent in the globalising political, economic and cultural system.37 They represent a transnationalisation of social movements, with the objective to counter-act transnational elite actors and to create alternative social frameworks.

---

36 Sreberny-Mohammadi 1997
37 see Notes from Nowhere 2003; also, this approach corresponds with ecological social theory, which advocates a decentralisation of power and an embedding of politics and economics in local community life (e.g., Helleiner 1996).
CS Media represent an important part in this model of global struggle between opposing interests. They often operate as decentral networks of local groups, whereas the mainstream media sector is operating in increasingly centralised structures. They challenge the picture of a single all-inclusive ‘global village’, suggesting instead a diversity of smaller ‘villages’. Their practices are based on the same dissident set of values as that of these social movements, and many have their roots in the same ‘direct action’ philosophy, i.e. to take things into their own hands to create viable alternatives. They, of course, serve as primary sources of information and propaganda.

As we have seen in this chapter, most civil society media show a common set of features, which offer a distinct contrast to the traditional media sector as outlined before. However, we have also seen that neither of the two groups represent an homogenous entity. While a global news agency such as IPS may share a number of features with commercial agencies, the structure of a public service broadcaster or the content of an oppositional newspaper may differ substantially from that of a global media conglomerate. The model outlined in the previous pages does not incorporate all media into two definite frameworks, but it establishes two ideal types of media as two opposing axes, between which different media organisations are situated:

- Corporate structure, concentration vs. Non-profit structure, decentral networks
- Centralisation of control vs. Decentralisation of control
- Hierarchical Organisation vs. Horizontal networks, autonomous groups
- Universality: ‘global village’ vs. Diversity: ‘variety of villages’
- Professionalisation, objectivity vs. Participation, public access, subjectivity
- Passive consumers vs. Emancipation and empowerment
- Content focus on elite and business interests vs. Content focus on the marginalised, counter-info, social change
- Commodification of information vs. Global Commons
- Hegemony vs. Counter-hegemony

These axes open a field of tension which media are exposed to. This field of tension will serve as a basis for analysing media activities at and around the WSIS.

4. Media activities at the WSIS

4.1. The WSIS: Structure, Themes, Processes

The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) is the latest in a current series of world summits organised within the United Nations framework. Following a decade of global conferences which started with the Rio summit on environment and development in 1992, it is the first to put information and communication on the agenda. The objective is to develop a common understanding of the information society and a common response to challenges such as the digital divide. The first half of this two-part summit took place in Geneva in December 2003, the second half will follow in Tunis in November 2005.

The preparatory process for WSIS1, which took almost two years, comprised a number of regional and thematic conferences as well as five major meetings of the preparatory committee (PrepCom) and led to an agreement on two official summit documents: the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action. While Swiss President Pascal Couchepin

38 Dowmunt 1993
called the documents a „constitution of information society“, they effectively represent the lowest common denominator between governments and are limited to general statements of intent. Conflicts over the content of the documents were so severe that – contrary to the original plans, and only thanks to major diplomatic efforts by the host country Switzerland – they were only passed in the final days before the actual summit. The summit itself served as a platform for presenting the results of the preparation process, surrounded by an information technology trade fair and a variety of civil society side-events.

The thematic framework of the WSIS has so far been very broad, ranging from internet governance to education, from cultural diversity to security aspects. Development has been a principal focus, as the new information and communication technologies (ICTs) are seen as a promising new approach to reach the Millennium Development Goals. The Digital Divide is to be bridged by an expansion of communication infrastructure, particularly the internet, while there is less emphasis on appropriate local technology. Following the break-up of the WTO negotiations in Cancun, the WSIS seemed to suffer the same fate, as an initiative by Southern governments, led by Senegal, to establish a Digital Solidarity Fund to finance bridging the digital divide was refused by the North. A last-minute compromise called for the creation of a working group to deal with this issue.

Conflicts between North and South also dominated debates on internet governance and on intellectual property rights. The former revolved around the question whether the business-dominated and US-based ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) or the inter-governmental ITU (International Telecommunications Union) would be an appropriate governance body. The conflict on intellectual property saw Brazil succeed in limiting a US-initiative to strengthen intellectual property rights and in pointing to the importance of the public domain and free software. On the issues of human rights and media the line of conflict shifted to the East-West axis, as the Chinese delegation temporarily refused to accept a prominent article of freedom of expression and press freedom. The Russian delegation managed to fortify the section on network and information security by calling for the prevention of using ICTs for criminal and terrorist purposes. Meanwhile user rights, data protection and privacy are almost absent from the documents. The regulative framework outlined for the information society focuses mostly on market-friendly, liberalised environments, with some limited space for public services.

4.2. Civil society involvement

The structure and thematic focus of the main organiser of the summit – the ITU – has influenced both the content of the summit and the roles of its participants. On the content-side there is an emphasis on technological infrastructure, and the rules for participation reflect the close relationships between the ITU and the private sector. For the first time at a UN summit, business enjoys an opportunity for double representation, both through its associations and through individual companies. However, civil society involvement has also been promoted, in what organisers have called a „new kind of summit“ which was to allow broad participation of non-gouvernemental actors. In reality, non-state actors were merely given observer status and were excluded from most negotiations and decision-making.

Civil society organisations created a network structure of thematic „caucuses“ which would create position papers and lobby documents and feed into a Content and Themes Group which would compile common civil society statements. After a relatively successful initial period of lobbying, civil society actors were increasingly excluded from negotiations and found an increasing number of their positions and thematic preferences deleted from the documents.
With three months left until the summit, a civil society plenary decided to stop focusing on lobbying but instead develop a civil society declaration. The declaration "Shaping Information Society for Human Needs", which was presented at the summit in December, criticises the privatisation and monopolisation of knowledge and emphasizes the global commons, community media, free software, human rights, privacy, and participatory, people-centered communication instead of profit-oriented information provision.

During the process of withdrawing partially from the WSIS process, civil society actors became increasingly aware of their legitimizing role at the summit. Whereas previously they had seen their role in providing expert knowledge, they now started to use the leverage of the "Multi-Stakeholder Process" which had been introduced by the organisers in response to the lack of legitimacy of government summits, shown impressively by recent summit protests, and which had been advocated as the prime innovation of the summit. Civil society declared the failure of the Multi-Stakeholder approach, and at the final press conference of PrepCom3 its representatives announced: “If governments continue to exclude our principles, we will not lend legitimacy to the final official WSIS documents”.40

4.3. Media actors at the WSIS

The main body for feeding media interests into the WSIS process has been the Media Caucus. Established as a civil society caucus at PrepCom2, it was however based on previous collaboration between several regional broadcasting unions from both commercial and public-service backgrounds. The unions represent large public service broadcasters, such as the BBC, RAI and the German ARD and ZDF, as well as commercial networks such the American CBS, NBC, Fox and Televisa. Despite operating within a civil society framework, the Media Caucus has effectively been a multi-stakeholder roundtable, combining a variety of different actors and viewpoints from the media sector, including prominent NGOs such as Article 19 and MISA, journalist unions like the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), communications and media researchers, commercial and public service media associations such as the World Association of Newspapers and the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), and temporarily even government actors such as the audiovisual regulation body of Catalunya. This wider arrangement has led to doubts and criticism by individual caucus members and other civil society actors, but as most media actors have defined themselves as civil society, a majority of civil society actors has preferred a vague notion of "openness" to a clear definition of the boundaries of civil society.

The initial statement of the Media Caucus marginalised CS Media concerns. CS Media were only mentioned in the 13th out of 14 articles, and only in a very limited and compromising way. As a result, CS Media actors, led by representatives of the World Association of Community Broadcasters AMARC, temporarily left the Caucus and established a Community Media Working Group (CMWG). This group has produced separate lobby documents and position papers, but it has also, after a period of separation, re-established itself as a subgroup of the Media Caucus and has continued to influence Caucus statements. At PrepCom3 it contributed to the removal of the Caucus chairman and the election of a CS Media-friendly chairwoman as well as a Vice-Chair from a CS Media organisation.

The attempts to create a common platform for media actors at the WSIS have frequently been interrupted by fundamental conflicts between CS Media, represented primarily by AMARC, and commercial media, represented by the International Association of Broadcasters (IAB).

39 see Hintz 2003
Public Service media, represented by the EBU, and press freedom organisations, such as the World Press Freedom Committee and Article 19, have aligned with different sides in different situations. While at PrepCom2 CS Media were isolated, they had a much stronger position at PrepCom3 and were able to withstand the attempts of marginalisation by the IAB, by creating alliances with other media actors.

Individual media companies did not participate directly in the WSIS, reflecting a general lack of interest by large parts of the business community. However media corporations such as Time-Warner, Sony and Polygram are members of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) which promotes the interests of business worldwide and which has been at the forefront of making business demands visible in the WSIS process.

At the other end of the media spectrum, many grassroots activist media from the Indymedia network, alternative magazines like Mute, and community media such as Aporrea from Venezuela chose not to participate in summit processes as they did not want to lend legitimacy to an inter-governmental summit which they regarded as an illegitimate and inappropriate body to regulate communication processes, many of which are based at the grassroots of society. They organised a series of events called WSIS? We Seize! to criticise the WSIS as an elite conference with a business-led agenda, and to promote a participatory version of an information society based on bottom-up processes. While refusing and criticising participation in summit processes, We Seize participants nevertheless hooked up with NGO representatives inside the summit and supported progressive elements there. So within the CS Media sector, a double strategy of participation inside and pressure from outside emerged. At the edges between inside and outside, a Community Media Forum gathered CS Media actors from around the globe and promoted their visions and views.

4.4. Objectives

The contributions by the IAB into the negotiation process represent prime examples for the objectives of the commercial media sector. They put a strong focus on freedom of expression, pointing out particularly threats to media independence by state-led interventions, and generally seek to „protect private broadcasting activities“ which constitute, according to the IAB, „an essential element for the existence of a free society.“ Commercial media, defined as „independent media“, are portrayed as the main advancers of freedom of expression and are therefore acting in the public interest. Any interference from outside in media operations, including media regulation, ethical standards for journalism etc., is rejected.41 There are striking similarities to the concerns of the ICC, which has focused its lobby efforts on advocating a business-friendly regulatory framework for creating technical infrastructure. Governments are advised to create competitive market-led environments, alleviate obstacles to investment as well as tax burdens, secure intellectual property rights, and foster cultural changes towards risk-taking and entrepreneurship.42

The early contributions of the broadcasting unions set the tone for the subsequent position papers of the Media Caucus. The broadcasters emphasised freedom of expression, media pluralism, universal and affordable access, and cultural diversity. They stressed that it is not communications technology as such, but rather the content transported through that technology, which is of prime importance. Therefore the media as major producers and

41 Quotes from the IAB contribution to PrepCom2 (see http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/iitu-s/md/03/whisp2c2c/S03-WSISPC2-C-0022!!PDF-E.pdf)
42 ICC contribution to PrepCom2: http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/iitu-s/md/03/whisp2c2c/S03-WSISPC2-C-0035!!PDF-E.pdf
distributors of quality content have a vital role to play in the information society. The Media Caucus followed along this track but broadened the agenda by involving a wider group of actors and extending the list of themes. Their commonly agreed document focuses on a recognition of media as producers and distributors of content for the information society, freedom of media and freedom of expression, with explicit mention of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It adds that public service values should be encouraged, the rights of online media workers should be protected, media concentration should be subject to scrutiny, and non-profit community media are recognised.

While the latter two points required far-reaching concessions by private media representatives, their actual wording largely reduced their original meanings. By advocating "general" anti-monopoly legislation and by confining community media to the edges and niches of the media sphere, the Caucus effectively neither called for a general reduction of media concentration, nor for a general increase in community media. These compromises were hardly acceptable for the IFJ and AMARC, particularly, and represented a starting-point for continuous struggles between representatives of different media categories, specifically between commercial and community media. Freedom of expression served not only as the prime lobby objective of the Media Caucus but also as a tactical means in this internal struggle. While the private sector used the term to argue against any media regulation, including limits on media concentration, community media referred to it to strengthen its own position and to build coalitions against repeated attempts by commercial media to reduce its role.

CS Media actors started to create distinct statements at PrepCom2 and, during the six months running up to the summit, developed a culture of debate and production which was far more vibrant than that of the Media Caucus. The main focus of most of these documents has been – somewhat in line with the summit agenda – on poverty eradication and development. CS Media are presented as the main channels for large parts of the world population to access information, particularly in the Global South, and therefore need to be promoted and strengthened. The second focus is on participation, noting that CS Media represent a prime channel for the public to participate in the information society, not just by receiving but by contributing information and knowledge. The emphasis here is on communication as a participatory and interactive process, rather than one-way information.

The community sphere represents the central level of reference. Priority is given to community-driven communication initiatives, developed in response to local needs and under community control. At the same time, there are explicit demands for a reform of global governance frameworks: CS Media should be allocated radio and satellite spectrum, should be supported by enabling country-level legislation, and should receive public funding to maintain its non-profit characteristics. At PrepCom3 the CMWG enriched the debates around a Digital Solidarity Fund by calling for a Community Media Fund as a targeted and efficient way to bridge the digital divide. With regards to other media, CMWG statements have consistently refrained from demands for state-action to restrict media ownership or the free flow of information, instead seeking to add diversity to the media sphere by strengthening the role of a third media sector alongside the existing public service and commercial media.

43 http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/wsispc2/c/S03-WSISPC2-C-0108!!PDF-E.pdf
45 see the statements by the Community Media Working Group at PrepCom2 (http://www.worldsummit2003.org/en/web/229.htm) and at PrepCom3 ("Community Media and the Information Society")
In addition to the CMWG, CS Media concerns have been advocated by collective civil society statements. From the beginning, civil society contributions to the WSIS process emphasised participatory communication, public involvement in the production of information, empowerment, people-centred governance frameworks, protection and reclamation of indigenous people’s culture and knowledge, and the extension of the public domain and the global information commons as a resource not to be sold for private profit. The assembled civil society caucuses aligned explicitly with the detailed CS Media demands, rather than the wider Media Caucus statements. When at PrepCom3 they published a list of “Seven Musts” – issues which they demanded to be included in the WSIS documents – Community Media occupied the top of that list.

What is particularly significant about the various media statements, in addition to the different sets of issues, are differences in interpretations of commonly used language. For most commercial and public service media, „media pluralism” refers to a variety of media outlets and content providers, while for CS Media it involves a diversity of content, thus a diversity of opinions as well as societal groups represented in the media. Traditional commercial and public service media maintain that production of information and „provision of content” are confined to media enterprises and should meet the media’s own quality standards. „Freedom of expression” therefore applies primarily to media organisations, the right to information is a consumers’ right, and „access” therefore is confined to the reception of (other people’s) information. The CS Media notion of information provision, in contrast, focuses on content-sharing and interactive distribution, access includes the ability both to receive and to produce content, and rather than advocating information rights, many CS Media follow a vision of „communication rights” which emphasise participatory and interactive aspects.

4.5. Negotiations and Outcomes

Article 55 of the WSIS Declaration and article 24 of the Action Plan represent the media sections of the documents. This in itself is a statement: Situated towards the very end of the documents, the media don’t play a central role in the WSIS conception of information society. However the debates around these articles represented one of the major lines of conflict during the WSIS negotiations. The chinese delegation, supported by other authoritarian government delegations like Russia and Cuba, strongly opposed a prominent emphasis on Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and questioned any formulation that would suggest a central role for media as independent, un-controlled actors. They clashed with the Swiss delegation who had set a strong media article as one of its prime targets for the WSIS negotiations – pushed forward by very active national journalist unions. The Media Caucus embarked on intense lobbying to support the Swiss position, having kept freedom of expression as one of the few issues it could still agree on during the final phase of negotiations.

In a second conflict, several Latin American delegations, led by El Salvador and supported particularly by those governments with strong ties with national media corporations, opposed regulatory measures against media concentration and refused to accept any mention of Community or other CS Media. The latter were defended by some European, African and Latin American delegations, however with limited commitment and in a way which made clear CS Media did not belong to the vital interests of any of the defenders.

46 http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/WSISPC2C-S03-WSISPC2-C-0071!!PDF-E.pdf
47 Many CS Media are aligned to the campaign „Communication Rights in the Information Society” (see http://www.crisinfo.org)
48 The documents are available at http://www.itu.int/WSIS/documents/doc_multi-en-1161%7C1160.asp
The final Declaration article does not represent the backlash against media freedoms which the Media Caucus had feared during the final phase of negotiations, but it does not set progressive precedents either. It reaffirms freedom of the press and freedom of information, without pointing explicitly to Article 19 UDHR (which however is mentioned at the beginning of the Declaration). It affirms pluralism and diversity of media but does not call for limits on ownership concentration, merely “encouraging” diversity of ownership. Article 24 of the Action Plan complements the weak language of the Declaration article, including, for example, the redundant call to „Encourage the media (...) to continue to play an important role in the Information Society“. While governments could agree to call for domestic legislation to guarantee media independence and pluralism, they, on the other hand, want to take „appropriate measures (...) to combat illegal and harmful content“. Here the control interests of governments did shine through, and they did even more so in the security section of the declaration, where the expression „information security“ may represent a trojan horse for censorship and content control.  

Any mention of CS Media was deleted from the media sections of the documents. The only vague reminder of CS Media is a call to „[g]ive support to media based in local communities“ in the section on cultural diversity of the Action Plan. The general focus of the documents is on new technologies, the most prominent actors are states and business, advocating „public-private partnerships“ as the most promising strategies and leaving aside community control, and interactive communication does not play a major role in the texts. So the results of CS Media lobbying activities are very weak. The official WSIS negotiation process represented a defeat for them.  

However this contrasted sharply with the focus of the events and public discourses around the summit. Side-events like the Community Media Forum and the World Forum on Communication Rights highlighted the experiences of CS Media, the main counter-event WSIS? We Seize! was organised primarily by CS Media activists, and even the World Electronic Media Forum, a mainstream media event almost as big as the summit itself, reserved one of its most central panels to celebrate the practices of grassroots citizens media. „Create your own media – make your own voice heard“ was repeated at a large variety of side-events and summit-discussions as a prime strategy to bridge the information divide. CS Media failed to leave their mark in the official WSIS documents, but they raised their profile in the discourses around information society, and they will be far more difficult to ignore next time.  

6. An outlook: CS Media and communication governance

The WSIS negotiations have triggered a major effort by CS Media actors to influence global communication governance. The first ad-hoc evaluations of CS Media actors immediately after the summit have been mixed. While some have pointed to the success of having achieved a fairly resonable media section in the WSIS documents, despite a hostile environment, as well as to the support CS Media have enjoyed from several governments, others have been disappointed by the failure to include CS Media-specific issues in the documents, or have questioned the lobby process altogether. For the next phase of the WSIS, CS Media actors are likely to attempt a more targeted approach, focusing lobby activities on

---

49 see Article 35 of the Declaration
50 see Article 23 j) of the Action Plan
specific governments to create a group of strong supporters, and at the same time highlighting CS Media practices in workshops, presentations, and practical demonstrations.  

The experiences of CS Media at the WSIS have partially questioned, but generally confirmed the model of CS Media which I have introduced in this paper – a construct of a CS Media sector separate from both public service and commercial media, with a distinct set of interests and practices, and acting in opposition to commercial media, particularly. On the one hand, the Media Caucus has tried to integrate a wide variety of media actors and to distill a common set of „media interests“. On the other hand, its work has regularly been overshadowed by conflicts between CS Media and commercial media representatives, in particular, which were often based on fundamentally different perceptions of media as well as information and communication processes. So the cross-sectoral cooperation of media actors within the Media Caucus has qualified the analytical framework for the media sector which I have proposed, by adding common interests and objectives, but as the Caucus has merely hidden the existing dividing lines temporarily, it has not refuted the general validity of the framework.

An opposition of interests between CS Media and commercial media was also reflected in the WSIS documents where lobbying by commercial media contributed to the deletion or the watering-down of CS Media objectives. However the control interests of states and their scepticism towards media independence proved to be equally detrimental for CS Media, so that the latter got caught up between the vital interests of states and business, without a prominent advocate to defend them. CS Media represent a vision of information society which goes beyond the state-market nexus to focus on a bottom-up approach, based on the community level. This vision emphasises participation, inclusivity, cultural diversity and autonomy. Their perspective on communication governance involves a central role for global common goods and the public domain.

My further research will seek to further clarify the counter-hegemonic role of CS Media in global communication governance, and it will develop a more systematic evaluation of the WSIS process from a CS Media perspective. For this it will be helpful to look at not just the WSIS debates which are directly related to media issues, but at some of the more general debates which touch on other fundamental differences in interpreting information society: the negotiations on intellectual property rights vs global commons, public domain and open standards; the regulatory framework envisioned in the documents and its tendencies towards either liberalisation and privatisation or public services; the understanding of cultural diversity and its role in the struggle against cultural homogenisation; a focus on interactive communication vs one-way information streams. A wider approach involving these debates will broaden CS Media concerns to a general question on the outcomes of the WSIS: Will information be controlled by the few or the many?

Bibliography

---

51 According to a first series of interviews with CS Media actors after the end of the summit.


